

Oct 87

Wf did K think he could get away with it?

- K should have installed SAMs, made the op,
before deploying missiles (as even McLean
thought he would) - in order, not to
protect missiles, but to detect / prevent
recon ...

(Did K think that US satellites would
spot missile deployment anyway?

Would they - not?)

K misses this info opportunity he was
entitled to SV on this segment, of "morons"
(on the mission) - by saying SAMs were not
to protect missiles or Cuba - there could
be enough (what were they for at all, then?
To force a large invasion, US attack, rather
than another Bay of Pigs?)

Roth, missiles protected SAMs: + thinks,
over op. Design was period of installing -
What would protect them then? K (by hypothesis): not SAMs;

but pre-election period — Pres willing to
admit issue to Reps before election —
along with SU going to public. "MUST MAKE DEPLOYMENT
JUST PRIOR TO ELECTION! OP DATE (by hgs) NOV 6! *
X

But why his on private channel?

(Bolshevik) Dole?

To show Pres' awareness? (It did!


(contin. to Sov)
Sobles

Partly because of
encouraging super-
secrecy! following
committee.

But it got counter,
warnings: ALL TOO LATE!

(Died JFK et al feel shame, vulnerability,
that they hadn't warned SU earlier,
before too late; and that they had, when
it was too late. (Mis-read EO both times)
— and and and and Bolshevik, Dole...

* lower high speed of construction, 22 Oct - 28
Oct — at risk of looking ominous!



Oct 10 81

Cuban Roulette

(Really, Russian - ^{north} American - Cuban Roulette:

a gun pointed at all the children of the world
(the "nuclear family")

with three (or, "many") fingers on the trigger -
and the trigger was in ~~the hands of~~ Cuba.

(+ Carib. writings).

Early American (Castro?) had advisors for more
reckless (let alone, domestic opponents);
each feared war; ^{each} professed "losing" crises
(without being him attacked) to losing or
even winning a war (or ^{JFK} risking a war more than
one more day (which could have been fatal).

But JFK could "afford, except" to lose any
one plane; K, perhaps, one SAM site;
after 27th, US (and SU!) "quota" was
exhausted (JFK: day is allowed "one bite")

K found ^{probably} loss of all SAM sites in 12
hours - not in his control to prevent this - indeed,
by telling JFK, either indicated on early 27th or
night of 27-28th! (Risk JFK could not stop even
or retal, & night not want to!)

"We must get it - but not yet"
Frank, deal -

RFR (on Stevenson) ... and in crisis

McN

- on Oct 25 (Lippman col)

26

27

"We'll have to give up Turkish winds ...
eventually"

(Nitzge, 15 Oct?,
Rusk

VN ...

JFK in 62? 63 ;

"Direct hit"

Bald: do it now ('61, '64, '65, '66)

McN, Oct-Nov 65 - "eventually" &

SU in Afghan? ...

CONGRESS: NOW IN PERSIAN GULF; CONTRAS...

10 Oct

just as there is a "logic of war" (SC, K)
that compels "decisions" in wartime,
"

there is a "logic of crisis" — the "knot of
war... smell of scorching hug in the air...

Persian Gulf, yesterday & this morning:

attack of US choppers on Iranian gunships;
both sides claim other fired first;
Iran using US Stingers...
Iran promising retaliation...

— Acknowledged yesterday & Wf died 1c fold as
and when he died, so soon after receiving
a 48-~~60~~ hour ult

(in effort: order will be given in
24 hours, if we don't know for it;
"It cannot be stopped after 48 hours;
because it will be annul out in 60 hours,
meaning Tuesday

[How much land time needed, & hit
missiles, et al?

Only 2 hours for SAM: one, or may?]

— and, so soon after making a demand? Wf
drop "reasonable" demand in 13 hours, 5 hours
after leaving rejection of it (only with ^{strong} hint of
US movement in that direction). (into 24-48-60?)

Answer: Because K faced the probable loss
of all his SAMs in 12-24 hours (or sooner!)
— and could do nothing to save if not given
that prob. significantly except take the entire —
accepting last US offer.

K found this from about 10 AM Saturday —
but decided to "hold on, hope for best," put
off announcement for 12 more hours, hoping US
would crack first (perhaps scared by
"SU" actions of shooting down U2: which
Scales said to Fomin.)

-Counter: What if Dole had been prepared
to say: Young men will be shot
down low-level?

(He almost did — "Cubans resent"...

But he didn't say: We can't control
Cubans (as SU did the next week);

or ... SAMs are now owned by Cubans
(true? or not?)

(He 'could not' say, "Cubans took over our
SAM site")

If SU could be seen there would be no
negotiation — or only high-level negotiators — for
48 hours, time to bargain — with RFK's offer
yet, RFK did not give a 12-hour ult.,
-18

he did not mean to give one - and if he had
(JFK meant to have U Thant "interview"
before the Soviet time to decide was
up! - so JFK would respond to
"new appeal." U Thant And not
yet weighed in on concessions of either
side, ~~at that~~ on possession / implement
of missiles - merely temporary, on moving the
on interfering.)

it would have looked like, and been,
merely a precursor to US attack. (ridiculous presumption!)

(Suppose RFK had openly done so...

SV about, presumption: As it was, at this point SV
if blockade, a very did feel "in the wrong," with
ambivalent one to a situation it was asked to
insiders admit...

[WHY SUCH SENSITIVITY BY JFK TO NOT "CROWING"?
WHAT IF DOBRYNIN HAD BEEN 'WIRED'? OR JUST, ASSERTED
THAT A DEAL HAD BEEN PROMISED! IT WOULD BE OFF -
BUT BELIEVED, COUNTERING JFK'S CROWING.

Oct 10-87

Moreover, JFK did not want to enhance belief
that Torgerson — and/or ult — had
"inevitably, safely" made lives back down —

He must have felt that with the ult did
do it (in which case, his own willingness to
break a Saturday [the position ^{role} ascribed to
Stevenson of Bartlett — to
accept Pres would be portrayed
with confidence Stevenson as relatively tougher, compared
would not retaliators to Stevenson, and even tougher
us - Pres (at worst, in account of Bartlett + Alsop]
against democrats)

It looked bad — and could be!

[Amusing it never has — may know
within accounts, including RFK's, were false,
yet never told, with heart so close —
leading to a generation of misjudged as to
what this Pres found "reasonable," and
wondering why to avoid war

[RUSK REV]

— or else he thought his offer had done it —
but then he had to keep secret,
couldn't defend it or admit it,
or he would be attacked, and would lose it,
perhaps worsening crisis :

He must have been afraid that deal would
collapse if US insisted K further — or
claimed Tongues had won (and he
'couldn't' announce the opposite — so appearance
of Tongues — But, "no secret deals" (his) —
provided as explanation

[Yet, "mystery": to CW public, it "couldn't
be — as Chinese said — that does mean
paper tiger, nothing to fear" (or then says CW):
and they didn't, really, talked or acted that way;
so, puzzle.]

Now asked was Pres if secret deal (which
he and down thought effective — enough! It
was an ult that did it — an unwittingly short-
deadline, big-credible ult : if you don't get out,

your loss. (a SAM?) all your SAMs, and
probably your wings, in 12^{hr} hours."

prob. of attack
was highly credible; response to attack...

(Continued recon - probed, questioned,
wildly wounded about by Dole

("If don't like it" -

= "the troops don't like it"

not we don't like it, and we'll shoot
or "If an is change"

see K's basic threat on Berlin since
1958: not to close veers,

but to "sign a peace treaty,"

and "you deal with ORG on veers" !

We boys will give up control, to them

(not modern, but people with power
and a sway of authority, which you
prefer not to recognize

(~~It~~ like countries, to Soviet;

or Soviet, to Russia;

PCO, to America

(is unlike unlike, or not?

as NC says)

"What would have happened if K had not backed down when he did?"

US ~~search~~ ...

or war (SAMs ...) on 28 Oct, in, not

~~search~~

Purs

^{+AA}
If SAM had not fired?

US ~~search~~

^{transcript}
(JFK moving of 27 Oct

+ JFK right of 27 Oct (Rush)

JFK did not want to fire first shot!

~~(Rush does not)~~

Nor did K — but he appeared to,
and was about to appear to
fire second shot!

(JFK would have fired third ...
and as he seem'd, or appeared of

Rush does not bring out implications of
Rush reception — ⁽³⁾ that otherwise (above)

but also (b) a One willing to trade, and

seeing risks high, nevertheless postponed
retreat and made new threats — to gain then on
known.

(If JFK/RFK had said, plausibly
(despite counter-arguments to keep the
pursuer on):

24-
"No reason for (48) hours, to give
you time to think, without provoking
Cuba into pursuing or shooting"

For even, no low-level reason for
24 hours? if SAMs were under
under control. But, how many?
Would it have happened?

At the least, pinpoint focuses attention
on question (Soviet?/asked in 1963:

What was Khrushchev thinking about
SAM shooting at Bet 27?! Like Sledge!
"Good shot! That will teach them!" see FOMIN

(as DeLozier hinted, to RFK)

(Dale could have talked about
"our hangers" — did he?
or "an Cuba" : Mikoyan replied the
after crisis (SAM/SA cockpit)
on 8

I was a young fool. - 62

The banks were old fools.

The slaves were benevolent cowards.

[like Congress today, willing

War Pans out

to vote us out of the

Western, "We look

help.

like fools, fools, -

as we watch in horrified
fascination...

NFT today, 10 Oct 87

like ants to the Press, unwilling to tell

him not to fight for Bank's nomination

not to back Bank's "courage" -

i.e. crying will to take others

down with him, to take revenge on those

who opposed and those who didn't

support his struggle or wining enough

(Whereas, Southern Senators who did not defy

the (black) Constitution, may not have

shown "courage" or far-right principles

(and may or may not have shown respect for dem

principles - see the bigat - but they felt the heat

in the best democratic way."

To give some dues credit — Ball? R?!

tho any have done as well as th could,
effectively, to prevent attack — give ExCo
powers (which gave hands just say?
or less than otherwise?) —

so long as Pres did not show his hand —
lead to win as done, against Pres
(see Stevenson).

Once JFK had made warnings, in
midst of political debate before campaign
— made the too late to deter K (who
had counted on the campaign to deter JFK
from revealing misdeeds, and must have
thought it was working till Oct 22!

and who (K) must not have foreseen
that his strategy, and assurances (prior to
warnings, of 4 left?) would so convince JFK
that, he would commit US, to
wound off attacks from Right, to whom
build-up was being directed, by Malone
(from de Vossjele!) —

Now, on 4 left, ⁺13 left, SU knew
(US didn't) ~~that~~ or should have known
(Dale, the Animators — not informed!)
that they, US-SU, had a problem.

Below hyp: ~~SB~~ K's behavior from this point on,
even more than before (then, a ^{to win} chance; big risk
for big reward) was desperately wild:
like

Eden is Luey (?)

or Stalin before Barbarossa.

~~Eden~~ Eden, JFK did not institute restrictions
on disarm, re PSALM, to "Kasper" "have
time to prepare a blockade or air strike
in case of SU mines"!! He thought there
was a very low chance of ~~that~~ Sov mines
(China) — esp. after warning.

But there was a high chance of
reports of mines — which his warnings
made much more politically explosive:
he had now agreed with his Rhee contacts
that SSMs (at least) would threaten
security, and were "unacceptable," calling for
military action;

He wanted to "muzzle the press" w.
reports that led to calls for action, or
condemnation of his "backdoor," before election.
W and - & but - is the small-prob con
that reports were true, he hoped to delay
necessity for response till after election —

assuming a slow build-up of info toward
credibility; not expecting photos of an
advanced build-up.

(PSALM protected him from realizing
the possibility in time to desorb comint)

[^NChie: If McCon had been in town ...]
or to withdraw from it before deployment was
for a long).

Just as McCon's DDI analysts were
hindered at his wrong, compared to
McC (and therefore, to Repubs!)

so was Pres, at looking private
assurances, ^{deliberately} in fear of Repubs (unless he
could make announcement of reality
— not just, "Soves have done this" but
"You Repubs were right, We were wrong!"—
with strong action (rallying support).

(He needed a crisis, as of 16 Oct 82).

Just as Reagan would only crisis in
Spring of 1987, as ICG unfolded. 'us. from
"I learned from

✓

JFK was opposed, in Oct 16, 62, to
change he had foolishly trusted SU —
the Great Satan — which had contemptuously
hoodwinked him —

just as R stood opposed to being
trusted Shan (!) to give hostages for him —
and Shan had hoodwinked.

R went gunning for Shan, joining
Kennedy + drug;

and JFK went gunning for SU.

(see AWWs, p. 255)

Oct 10, 1987

Scenario

VFR knows that R intend "attack" to his ult
might be another shootdown.

(What was scheduled for near
Sunday morning? Low?
High?)

Hyp: ~~WFB~~ [?] R's Rusk ploy, he couldn't have
want to respond by hitting all SAMs —
why trade after that?
Wf not hit mines, etc.?

So he must have want to
hit one SAM (or 2-3),
tighter blockade,
was probably on near...

the "accept" U Thant proposal of trade,
looking strong, "shooting way out of
Palooza" (WFB strat., Nov 64)

Oct 11

K + JFK

- Both ready to quit by Oct 26 -

but with diel - while Castro
find away - ^{with strike on Quito}
with US thinking, and SV letting
"Not yet - as more to
CIRK CW LN 1964: Miller..."

US think, that SV was "in control"

see AUNs

giving threats to a country, is evidence
of its nationality and consequence ("süß")
that should let control slip to a new
regime that could not be concerned
like (VN, Libya, Iran...)

(Kennedy School looking not only
in Kennedys, and the aid
but in the Presidency
and in Controllability)

unlike Ball
or Baden

[McN knows better - but like
McG B, will not say, "We / I / my Pres
were wrong", was, about anything.

Is this psychological, political, humanistic,
historical?

Oct 11, 87

Memoirs

- That JFK was right - coming to recent events in view - when he put the probability of all-out war ~~Adigen~~ = the CMC, as high as $1/3$ to $1/2$ - but

- but he was right for reasons he didn't know, and the US intell com has failed to understand for the last 40+ years.

= For all his real concern about miscalculation, about losing control of events Cas at the outset of WWI.

WWI could have begun in Oct 82

as WWI did begin - of a shot from outside the circles of major states - not this

time, even more dangerously, wrongly attributed to ~~disrupt~~ the kind of state of a superpower

"If we ~~are~~ knowing!"

He wanted to avoid anyone in saying that - he failed.

He — and K — were gambling in the
dark; the biggest bet, unknown to
JFK, was made by ~~anyone~~ someone
tho ~~he~~ didn't know was at the table
as an independent player: Castro, who
chose to defend his airplane with
weapons JFK & his advisers thought
were under Soviet control.

To deter any further firing at neon
plans, JFK (RFK) controlled himself to
convey at threats of escalation that
were directed to the wrong party and,
in any case, ^{unknown to the US,} were sure to fail. This was
the case with RFK's warning that neon would fly out.

[If K had warned/ordered
Castro — could he have influenced
his? Probably not. Could he
be sure Castro could stop all
firing by morning? Certainly not.]

Instead of firing a firing credible 48-hr
ult (this was really a bluff) K feared a totally
credible 12-hr ult: Real hardball!

[K could doubt that the 48
ult he was also facing ~~could~~
could be carried out — we now
know it probably could not have
been, if no ^{now} US recon plans were
launched — and it left him a day
to maneuver, to press counter-offers
and threats.

But he could not doubt that
US recon plans would be shot at
the next morning, 12 hours away; and that
the US could retaliate, probably on a
large scale, if a 2nd plane was hit.
Which meant that Soviet missiles and
troops were in immediate jeopardy
unless he started dismantling these
~~nights and informed the US that the~~
^{the missiles} ~~the missiles~~ ^{the missiles} ~~the missiles~~
the immediately (in hopes that would
defuse the US reaction even if Castro
did hit another plane).

]

Looking back on other crises in the
light of this, we can see that
"catalytic war"

has always been a ^{fundamentally} ^{independent} real factor: that the actions of
allies or clients of the US or SU has
always been a factor potentially more
significant than ^{other} catalysts have realized,
and often more than the US or SU gave
credit, appreciated.

[Korea '53; Korea '50; (+ Bhutan?)]

Quang - Moten (the realized;
did China, SU?)

Siberian - Kuwait?

Yugoslavia - Greece 1947!

Israel 1973 (+ Egypt?)

Suez '56

65-73 (RT)

VN: '64, '65, (59-60?)

"Siberian Taiwan"

Superficial control concentrated on both sides;
Underestimation of nationalist fervor:

sentiment, willingness to act against great odds
AND WILLINGNESS OF US+SU TO GAMBLE "in"

Policy Implications

- 1 - The experts have been wrong, and the ^{+JFK} public now right, about the real risks of major war and are war in the next 25 years. ^{Shows about responsibility} "responsibility, control, + crisis management, are (+ specif. in CMC) sketchy."
- 2 - High priority of avoiding war prolif:
e.g. Pakistan, Iran, Iraq (if black and stayed longer)
- 3 - " " " stopping int-sale of advanced weapons.
see risks of "coercive strategies" (RT, Niechilga) ^{don}
- 4 - Both of these regime ^{US} abandoning FCU threats prop. (rep. - TW) and improving exp. unilateral intervention politics: Vigilantes...
See G's new proposals!/
World Court; Int Law; UN Peace Force
- 5 - For ignoring any control of acts of war,
restraining Expe Tendencies as Const. intend. W2 Peace Creat, & highlight

6. Stinner they, forward a US-SU
links, he ignored the relative
importance of small "actors," and
the generally importance of the leaders.
(to avoid failure;

and then
witness
to let
small,
"crazy"
chance
states
commit
the
(as in USSR)

Was K's game really more
makers than JFK's, is not known?!
(The statement - AWW - was a
"escalator") (K had to jump off).

[JFK's warning was totally
unjustified, or ignoring out of "#1" -
with China not SU was entitled to do
what US and its allies did not know: a
kind of aggression by US [not of SU,
as AWW said]

K's seeing any makers; or provocation
but not seeing of USG in 1964-65!

[K knows he was limited, is Committee and in SU.
he didn't seem to realize that limited
what he could be permitted to do to
catch up! (or at least, how he could be
permitted to do it).

- 2d plane: quote McN

"Having emptied the house..."

- too ones

- losses in Cuba - 20,000 (highly)
(no. Taylor, tanks)

Mikoyan says "40,000" low troops.

[Gantsoff: during crisis, low-level
near Havana 4 units, ~~about~~ about
2500 each - ~ 10,000 : + SAMs, spres, etc.
- 16-20,000.

11 Oct 87

IF Stone - was in Havana just after the C.I.

I have the feeling from things I heard that Castro was pissed off at the Russians for not standing firm - so I can

Robert Gore, Sr. told IF Stone just after Bay of Pigs: he saw JFK the day after Bay of Pigs group was captured; he was red-eyed, sleepless... he said in a fury,

"Those sons-of-bitches wanted to get me into a war!" Jby. (Admiral?) called him at two in the morning and said, "The breadbasket has fallen. Will you let us go in now with air?"

[so that's why he was so furious at JFK! Did he suspect they let him go in with a faulty, inadequate plan so he could have to commit US forces? See what CIA Cos told Shruborn & Guantanamo! the bank... VN...

1100587

Cognitive

Implications:

, for both hands & downs

1. Amman Boyle: Wf K folded when he died.

2) (IF/Stan) What would have happened if he didn't? about what JFK saw or "with intentions"

Rush Rev = EX/Can has lied to us all for 25 years

(1982: still lied about JFK attitude in morning of 27th, and "Rush")

3. Rush Guardian Brewer on: What were the plans?

risks of war... and TN War? As high as

JFK thought (see Ridge: 10%; hsp $\frac{1}{1000}$) - or downs?

JFK saw the risk - and took it, prolonged it.

4. Scamper "lessons" of crises, for both

hands & downs:

- not "Thall" did it;

- not "control" (see JFK + Scali, 27 Oct)

"communication"

SAC U-2; Navy;

SAC may - clear;

plan

Control AA

- not "stand firm and down will come"

- not "downs are rational, in control, control

the satellite"

(see correction of 1964-65 SU/NUX to control VC!)

- not, "down, thinks + hinted attacks

are safe; risk of TN War low...

Doesn't suggest can not in the Times?

Epitaphology of Crisis History

5. Rains question: How could any DE know this? How, if facts are true, could US intell com and analysts have missed it for 25 years?

[see ^{Heard's guess that McN, McG had to} know. No - sig. not seen.

[Suppose SC had "blockaded" movement of further PII's to Kennedy...

6. Willingness on both sides to gamble - the world - 'one man day' ("We'll try again - ^{to win} ^{to that} rather than strike on Israeli) - rather than accept some political/procedural ("natural") limitation / failure (loss of ^{his} ^{subordination} ^{of} ^{reluctance} confidence of boss + colleagues + allies]

7. Model IV - no. I, II, III, and "Crisis management."

[The Kennedy school is to the study of the Presidency what "Top ^{Guy} ~~Gun~~" is to the study of war.]

"This presentation has been made with the collaboration of the Defense Dept."

(= the interests of security, budgets, morale)

Pat: "This line of identity are based on the notion of controllability."

"Best and Brightest"

1949

Fall of China, McCarty, Vinn, SU A-Bomb

1950

→ Korea, and to French, H-bomb, defense build-up ^{N3C-68}

Acheson (USCIB: "most over-enthusiastic statement")

Bush, Clifford, Kennett, McCloy, Nitze

1961: 80 of Pops, Vinn, Bush Wall, Kase → ^{achieve} _{JN}

CII:

1962 → Air strike proposal / blockade / "No trade
in Turkey"...

McG B, McN: Acheson, et al... (not Clifford?
w/ not?)

1963: Bin across:

1964: VN falling → Tanki Half, broken

1965

PT, invasion, ground war

McG B, McN, et al

up to standards of: N/HAL

Land/Managing

JFK (+ Edwin K, by pretty in AA, SAMP + SSMs)
had created a situation where in 12 hours
situation would pass out of control of
either US or SU — of Cuba's action:

Cuba had been given the power
(without knowing it) to trigger US-SU
war — ^{in 12 hours} — by "defending its airspace"
(against low orbits).

JFK meant to give K the trigger —
and the alternative of getting out — of starting
US-SU immediate process in 48 hours
— but also the alternative of remaining
SU demands in next 24 hours. (at risk
of "delaying too long to open the parachute")

(a risk JFK took Saturday, and last
night)

Chicken:
Metaphor: sky-diving jump together: 1st one
down, wins!

(aim is to open chute just after other
does — though if you can commence other you'll
go all the way down rather than open first one.)

4 Oct 87

McB, McN, ...

(Dams or "dams" (also, Humphreys)
looking back, must ask themselves,
why did K back down first?

Was he more reasonable, congruous,
than they?

or had they been wrong to be so scared?
or, so threatening?

Were they wrong to think (privately)

- they should back down, and would have
to (the latter, yes: but why?
how "wrong" had they been?

- or wrong to persist, long enough to win
(for K to be "available")?

"How could we" have originated
in "as dead" or Saturday (like "How could
we" in VN - a feature) given the actual

expectations: K wasn't comrade, was is likely,

Turk minutes and Sov Gen minutes make
no wildly difference, "prestige alone" as issue.
+ "alliance" not unimportant, but...

Hantkeff, Oct. 19

Culero did not control SAMs till much later — November? or even spring of 1963. Statements (mentioned in Stevenson cables a U Thant conversation — but role not identified; G doubts ^(?) he was in full charge of how missiles; and does not believe Danthor was in full charge of all how forces in Cuba: G conjectured, in charge of AA & SAMs — but J pointed out, Mel'ucci, of Bona CM site, reported to him...) was wrong in saying Culero the controlled SAMs — but that my guess here has a way of explaining that the SAMs & AA would not be removed: "all low-normal equipment would go." (± 1-280? Culero not trained to fly.)

G's book apparently says Castro removed SAMs with Cuban ground troops on 28 Oct, — to keep the from going?

The US "won" the CMC — but how? Why?

Why never have stopped policies for 25 years:

"SU backed down ^{without test of war} [when it did?] because it had to: give US conv. sub. in Carib., and me. ^{step.}
[did that prevent deployment?]

Castro firing?

Would it have assumed ^{SU} backdown if Castro had not fired?

Would it have prevented US backdown if ... ?]

- This, backdown was inevitable: either with or soon after war started: how, no risk of [like saying "Oct 19 Market Crash ^{on Oct 19...} major rose or down!"]
supposed ... because it was inevitable

(Why on Oct 19?

not years sooner?

later, why not later?

gain so 'late': was it "inevitable"?)

(as though: "no chance of big profits in stocks in late 1987"!)

[Or — N had to get out of VN, after 1965-1968!

Never, from '73; May '75...]

or, JFK 'had' to get out of VN (because US was bound to lose)

RAW JFK

JFK had lost control of events -

he thought he had bluffed, not
committed himself (to 48-hour halt),

Allen
Whelan
sentences
construction

- could still back down, and probably
would ^{if he didn't back down} then, could & would
manage/control events, avoid
war. ^{with it} ~~the~~ loss of control, loss of
ability to back down, regain peace -
or win - short of great slaughter.

- K: rolls through...

JFK thought war would come only
if both sides refused to back down
about missiles: and he was not going
to let that happen.

But he assumed "the other side"
(K, he thought) was ^{probably} not committed to
shooting another man plane down
(a Sunday - before he could back down)
whereas he was (perhaps more than he knew).
So he made "wrong" with some confidence.
on reason

But K knew Castro was committed to
firing — he could not control that —
he knew JFK would fly near; plane
might be shot (even by SAM);

and he could not be confident
JFK would not retal. to that

— whatever JFK thought or said
(He said he would)

Not that he, K, "could" then refrain from
retal. to that — coming close to possible
CS FU...

JFK had, in fact, wound up his
control means, his ability to avert war
(the notion which K died, if K were
"rational").

K had exactly one way left to
~~to~~ avert a high risk of war, and
losing his SAMs and SSMS to air or captures;
get SSMS on the way out, undisturbed.
He took that "last clear chance" to avert
war.

Pres. saws Johnson would JFK
to avoid ultimat - as group had
agreed earlier, before 22 Oct.

Yet that is what he did ...

(as best try, to win - before ending
"pressure," risks, "surrendering"...

Not knowing the risks this ran in the
level of

next 12 hours - without which,
K would have not have folded.

His long shot imposed high
mutual risks on US & SC (and would)
- which K could not reduce
by "explaining" (as in strangulation)

[and K would have had to
explain his failure to explain
within 10 AM + 7:45 PM -

like JFK's failure to explain SAC
U-2: Why? Though McN had wanted
→ ASW
Pressure! Heavy! (Chick, fool, 27 Oct
to use hot-lives! according to Bushnell!)

(Note: Not-his my not he used!

(Did it exist? Could McN

have said what Bushnell remembered?]

The following explanation, which emerged as a by-product of '64 and has been strengthened by later info, some last week, is not familiar even to former participants and academic specialists: and evidence that suggested it and has tended to confirm it was known ^{to Americans} in 1962 or was ~~being~~ recent and very closely held even within the gov.

Info emerging now, with the 25th anniversary, ^{helps} makes it ^{possible} to correct some misconceptions that have shaped the as well as, US intelligence strategies and efforts: some of the risks of war (much lower than the public's estimates) erroneously for 25 years.

There is strong evidence that

Lucy, Kim

22 Oct

K used/abused a private channel
(Bolshevik) to convey a false statement
(no SSMs) and a diff. channel (Dob.) to
convey misleading statements (no offensive weapons)

But JFK, on Oct 27, used by private
channel (RFK) to convey false statements:

1) He would hit missiles unless
K took the ant.

2) He "had indeed" Jewish miners at -
if was ^{in house of} going out. Refuted

this, ^{of posture} would be [He didn't say: "I have
achieved in 4-5 (6) months:
though no US commitment to maintain been defined"] (not true,
it* and a misleading statement: ^{anyway})

(3) if Jewish traders & Russia claimed to
have influenced the removal of taking
the missiles out (which would have
been true!) if would not go out.
(here, ^{of posture} would be maintained).

This implied public trade (argu^{ment} of states, rights)
was unacceptable to JFK - which was false.

* There was no agreement ^{commitment} in '62 not to have land I/RBM's
also SU... PII did not violate, much... but practice

(Though - check? - RFR did not say that,
as Scali had - as now ^{his} letter did.)

K lied privately - saying he would ^{surely} not
but misleads in;

UFR lied in saying he would ^{surely} handle
the out, ^{if K did not withdraw the,} in strike, rather than trade
the ~~public~~ ^{public} as ~~let~~ ^{let} the story.

and let Scali, unwittingly (like Dole)
say the same (or, deny the poss. of a trade:
the message RFR/UFR registered as public
message). (not to increase chances of
~~ultimately~~ "acceptance" (+ ultimatum) of
other offer: but to allow hedge,
to allow fall-back when this offer
failed, as expected - without, however,
losing chances of win still further

(obvious problem of comm.)

SAC U-2 and SAM and Scali
all helped!).

Soviet Views on the Munich Crisis
ed. Ronald Pope

Univ. Press of America 1982

Vol. II, K number, 1974 (after death
~ 71)

797-6035 Hawthoff

Fall of Khushkub

Hyland and Shryock

Fater -

Bowen 4:30

MEH - 6

Robert

CBS

Shakne: 20 Oct 87 tel con

- Buntatofsky said he was sure no Soviet
officer had fired [Genthoff: B told
private session, "K was very concerned,
very worried over shootdown; 'shocked,
surprised...'"]

- But Mikoyan told private session,
it was a Soviet officer.

[Wf wouldn't he say nationality
to press?]

- RS: A Cuban has told CBS it was
a Soviet general, "angry ... [at...?]
He disobeyed orders."

- RS: has confirmation that "RFK" (Mayaguez)
sent 3 troops into Cuba during
Crisis; "one was in the area of
firefight" ~~troops~~ - so Mikoyan
^{speculation} could have been right."

[Ball doubted that 2nd plane was downed, "or I would remember it."

Szyble was in Guatemala just after crisis - thinks he would have heard.

So - I missed a "flap" (day before election!) - but maybe plane was recovered.

RS: Others, like Mark. and Barlatzky, doubt fight was with Castro troops; n, Cuban takeover.

(But Genthoff thinks it possible*, "Boris Medvedev simply" excluded the poss., "not because he knows ; he is very protective of SC-Cuban relations.

* with, or both, SC fight with Castro troops, takeover.

However, Genthoff, like Szyble, doubts it could have been the "Escambray gemillas" (Szyble: maybe group; too far away; very rugged country.)

RS agrees that Castro control of A4
was by plane (as does Ray Vailliant,
who asked us to report Bur. story of
car to radio station.)

Blizat told RS: "^{+McN}JFK cancelled even
for Sunday, because it might get
fired on."

VO: (McN recommended no U-2,
Sunday; but JFK wanted to see "if
it got fired on" — after RFK thru).

See Lynde story of night of
27th...

"Non-rational Cognitive Processes"

Read: Steinbrenner, "Cognitive Theory
de Rivero "Psychic Dimensions..."
Jensen: Victims of Hypothesis
Steinbrenner, "Beyond Rational Decision"

(Ball & Allison, BPM)

Holmes

Lebanon

Jack C. Langdon (RAND)

Jensen

Burns


IC/T et al

Rosenberg

Blight

Gundloff - Bitto

19 Oct 87



Stability

Oct 20 1987

61-
1962 represented about impaired
system stability:

1) SU perceived US superiority
(though K bluffed; threatened

K took provocative initiatives

K took risky steps (Cuban II) to
overcome US sup.)

(but K backed down ^{+ Quesada + Koss} in CMC + Berlin,
and did not threaten or use long. etc.)

where (2) US Pres, Sec Def, Sec, MCB B,
perceived parity, and were not inclined
to risk strike / invasion in Cuba or SU states in
Turkey

(yet: Berlin, CMC threats;
commitment;
mobilization

(at all this - it turns out - with fear,
sense of bluff, intention to back down
("later") - ... drive 'supp.' to look longer
as long as possible ...

364

20 Oct 87

(on fork C. Sager on CMC)

[FU threats are perceived as "deterrent"
but they would commonly be
"compellent": "You must retreat,
back off, stop doing X, leave
on territory, clear to surround Y, ..."

"clear mobilizing" ^{both} ~~both~~ ^{players} employed
WWI. "Compellent strategies" is a
first-strike [unstable] world

See Born as quintessential "pragmatist"
(who knows better — + admiral DE! —
but gave us MX
now, tough on Persim Half...

See McN lies on Pers' attitude; (Translating)
— to view of FU
" " " " are sup, and its value
" " " " " need for 1200 MM
(for MIRV?)
for "light" ABM

Knuthoff 19 Oct 87

Op Plan 3-12 was for air strikes;
3-16 was invasion - done prior
to CII.

3-14 was for too much ops in Cuba,
it was modified by JCS through
CII; only several days after Oct 28
did JCS "stop" ops for 3-14,
except invasion as necessary for 3-16;
ops for 3-16 continued well into
November. [presumably what I saw in
June '61]

G. asked McN if he knew of 3-14;
he didn't, but "wasn't surprised."